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After the Second World War, India, along with other developing coun-
tries, chose a strategy of import substitution as a means of industrializing.
In the past two decades, however, many countries have begun to favor
global economic integration, and in particular trade liberalization, as a de-
velopment strategy. Although there is a general presumption that trade lib-
eralization results in a higher gross domestic product (GDP), much less is
known about its eﬀects on income distribution. The distributional impacts
of trade are particularly important in developing countries, where income
inequality is typically pronounced and there are large vulnerable popula-
tions. If economic integration leads to further growth in income inequality
and an increase in the number of poor in developing economies, the bene-
ﬁts of liberalization may be realized at a substantial social cost unless ad-
ditional policies are devised to redistribute some of the gains from the win-
ners to the losers.
Standard economic theory (Heckscher-Ohlin model) predicts that gains
to trade should ﬂow to abundant factors, which suggests that in develop-
ing countries unskilled labor would beneﬁt most from globalization. The
rising skill premium in the United States is often cited in support of stan-
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Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Globalization and Poverty.challenged.1 According to the new theories, trade liberalization could re-
duce the wages of unskilled labor even in a labor-abundant country,
thereby widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Moreover, even if
global economic integration induces faster economic growth in the long
run and substantial reductions in poverty, the adjustment might be costly,
with the burden falling disproportionately on the poor (Banerjee and New-
man 2004). Due to the ambiguity of the theory, the question of how trade
liberalization aﬀects poverty and inequality remains largely an empirical
one.
Recent empirical work has attempted to address the question, focusing
mostly on the eﬀect of trade liberalization on within-country income in-
equality. Studies using cross-country variation typically ﬁnd little relation-
ship between trade liberalization and levels or rates of change of inequal-
ity.2 However, these studies face signiﬁcant problems: cross-country data
may not be comparable, sample sizes are small, and changes in liberaliza-
tion may be highly correlated with other variables important to income
processes. A promising alternative is to use microevidence from household
and industry surveys. Several studies examine the relationship between
trade reforms and skill premia, returns to education, industry premia, and
the size of informal labor markets. However, the ﬁndings of these studies
are typically based on correlations and may not always be given a causal in-
terpretation. And while there is some evidence on the eﬀect of liberaliza-
tion on industrial performance and wage inequality, the literature has so
far ignored the next logical step: the impact of these performance changes
on poverty.
This paper investigates the impact of trade reforms on poverty and in-
equality in Indian districts. Does trade liberalization aﬀect everyone
equally, or does it help those who are already relatively well oﬀ while leav-
ing the poor behind? How does it aﬀect income distributions within rural
and urban areas? And is the eﬀect of liberalization felt equally across re-
gions in India?
India presents a particularly relevant setting in which to seek the answers
to these questions. First, India is the home of one-third of the world’s poor.3
Second, the nature of India’s trade liberalization—sudden, comprehen-
sive, and largely externally imposed—facilitates a causal interpretation of
the ﬁndings. India liberalized its international trade as part of a major set
of reforms in response to a severe balance-of-payments crisis in 1991. Ex-
tremely restrictive policies were abandoned: the average duty rate declined
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1. See Davis (1996), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Stiglitz (1970), Cunat and Maﬀezzoli
(2001), Banerjee and Newman (2004), and Kremer and Maskin (2003).
2. See Edwards (1998), Lundberg and Squire (2003), Rama (2003), Dollar and Kraay
(2002), and Milanovic (2002).
3. Based on 2001 World Bank estimates. See http://www.worldbank.org/research/pov
monitor/.by more than half, and the percentage of goods importable without license
or quantitative restriction rose sharply. The lower average tariﬀs, combined
with changes in the tariﬀ structure across industries, provide ample varia-
tion to identify the causal eﬀects of trade policy on income processes.
Coincident with these tariﬀ reductions were signiﬁcant changes in the
incidence of poverty and income inequality. To determine whether there is
a causal link between liberalization and changes in poverty and inequality,
this paper exploits the variation in the timing and degree of liberalization
across industries, and the variation in the location of industries in districts
throughout India. The interaction between the share of a district’s popula-
tion employed by various industries on the eve of the economic reforms
and the reduction in trade barriers in these industries provides a measure
of the district’s exposure to foreign trade. In a regression framework, this
paper establishes whether district poverty and inequality are related to the
district-speciﬁc trade policy shocks. Because industrial composition is pre-
determined and trade liberalization was sudden and externally imposed,
it is appropriate to causally interpret the correlation between the levels
of poverty and inequality and trade exposure. Of course, if there were mi-
gration across districts in response to changes in factor prices, an analysis
comparing districts over time may not give the full extent of the impact of
globalization on inequality and poverty in India. However, the analysis still
gives a well-deﬁned answer to the question of whether inequality and pov-
erty increased more (or less) in districts that were aﬀected more by trade
liberalization.
The study ﬁnds that trade liberalization led to an increase in poverty rate
and poverty gap in the rural districts where industries more exposed to lib-
eralization were concentrated. The eﬀect is quite substantial. According to
the most conservative estimates, compared to a rural district experiencing
no change in tariﬀs, a district experiencing the mean level of tariﬀ changes
saw a 2 percent increase in poverty incidence and a 0.6 percent increase in
poverty depth. This setback represents about 15 percent of India’s progress
in poverty reduction over the 1990s.
It is important to note that this exercise does not study the level eﬀect of
liberalization on poverty in India but rather the relative impact on areas
more or less exposed to liberalization. Thus, while liberalization may have
had an overall eﬀect of increasing or lowering the poverty rate and poverty
gap, this paper captures the fact that these eﬀects were not equal through-
out the country, and certain areas and certain segments of the society ben-
eﬁted less (or suﬀered more) from liberalization.
The ﬁnding of any eﬀect of trade liberalization on regional outcomes is
puzzling in the trade theorist’s hypothetical world, where factors are mo-
bile both across geographical regions within a country and across indus-
tries. Factor reallocation would equate incidence of poverty across regions.
In a closely related study (Topalova 2004b), I present evidence that the
Trade Liberalization, Poverty, and Inequality 293mobility of factors is extremely limited in India. The geographical in-
equalities are explained by the lack of relocation: migration is remarkably
low, with no signs of an upward trend after the 1991 reforms. In the study
I further examine the mechanisms through which trade liberalization
aﬀected poverty and inequality, establishing that the lack of geographical
mobility is combined with a lack of intersectoral mobility. Changes in rel-
ative output prices led to changes in relative sector returns to sector-
speciﬁc factors. As those employed in traded industries were not at the top
of the income distribution on the eve of the trade reform, the reduction in
income caused some to cross the poverty line or fall even deeper into
poverty.
This study is related to several strands of literature. First, it ﬁts into the
recent large empirical literature on the eﬀects of trade reforms on wage
inequality. This literature has largely dealt with the experience of Latin
American countries: Cragg and Epelbaum (1996), Revenga (1996), Han-
son and Harrison (1999), Feliciano (2001), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001),
and Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004). Currie and Harrison (1997)
study the eﬀect of trade liberalization in Morocco. These papers typically
ﬁnd small eﬀects of trade on wage inequality of workers in the manufac-
turing sector. This paper extends this type of analysis by focusing not only
on the eﬀect of trade reforms on relative wages in manufacturing but on re-
gional outcomes in general, thus capturing how trade eﬀects seeped from
the directly aﬀected manufacturing and agricultural workers to their de-
pendents, as well as people involved in nontraded-goods sectors.
This is also one of the ﬁrst studies to examine the link between trade lib-
eralization and poverty. So far Porto (2004) and Goldberg and Pavcnik
(2004) have analyzed the relationship between trade and poverty in the
case of Argentina and Colombia respectively. Porto’s approach has the ad-
vantage of providing a general equilibrium analysis of the relationship be-
tween trade liberalization and poverty, by simultaneously considering the
labor market and consumption eﬀects of trade liberalization, but his re-
sults rely on simulations based on cross-sectional data. Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2004), exploiting cross-sectional and time series variation at the
industry level, ﬁnd little evidence of a link between the Colombian trade re-
forms and poverty. Yet, as the study focuses on urban areas and people in-
volved in manufacture, it may be missing the really poor. This paper relates
plausibly exogenous changes in trade policy to poverty and inequality,
studying both manufacturing and agricultural workers in both urban and
rural areas. In addition, by deﬁning the district as the unit of observation,
it overcomes important selection and composition eﬀects that studies at
the industry level may face. Finally, the paper contributes to the literature
on industry wage premia and their relation to trade protection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 describes
the Indian reforms of 1991 focusing on trade liberalization, while section
294 Petia Topalova7.3 presents the data used in the analysis. In section 7.4 the empirical strat-
egy is explained, and the results follow in section 7.5. Section 7.6 con-
cludes.
7.2 The Indian Trade Liberalization
India’s postindependence development strategy was one of national self-
suﬃciency and stressed the importance of government regulation of the
economy. Cerra and Saxena (2000) characterized it as both inward looking
and highly interventionist, consisting of import protection, complex in-
dustrial licensing requirements, pervasive government intervention in ﬁ-
nancial intermediation, and substantial public ownership of heavy indus-
try. In particular, India’s trade regime was among the most restrictive in
Asia, with high nominal tariﬀs and nontariﬀ barriers, including a complex
import licensing system, an actual user policy that restricted imports by in-
termediaries, restrictions of certain exports and imports to the public sec-
tor (canalization), phased manufacturing programs that mandated pro-
gressive import substitution, and government purchase preferences for
domestic producers.
It was only during the second half of the 1980s, when the focus of India’s
development strategy gradually shifted toward export-led growth, that the
process of liberalization began. Import and industrial licensing were eased,
and tariﬀs replaced some quantitative restrictions, although even as late as
1989–90 a mere 12 percent of manufactured products could be imported
under an open general license; the average tariﬀ was still one of the high-
est, greater than 90 percent (Cerra and Saxena 2000).
However, the gradual liberalization of the late 1980s was accompanied
by a rise in macroeconomic imbalances—namely, ﬁscal and balance-of-
payments deﬁcits—which increased India’s vulnerability to shocks. The
sudden increase in oil prices due to the Gulf War in 1990, the drop in re-
mittances from Indian workers in the Middle East, and the slackened de-
mand of important trading partners exacerbated the situation. Political
uncertainty, which peaked in 1990 and 1991 after the poor performance
and subsequent fall of a coalition government led by the second largest
party (Janata Dal) and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the chairman of
the Congress Party, undermined investor conﬁdence. With India’s down-
graded credit rating, commercial bank loans were hard to obtain, credit
lines were not renewed, and capital outﬂows began to take place.
To deal with its external payments problems, the government of India
requested a standby arrangement from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in August 1991. The IMF support was conditional on an adjust-
ment program featuring macroeconomic stabilization and structural re-
forms. The latter focused on the industrial and import licenses, the ﬁnan-
cial sector, the tax system, and trade policy. On trade policy, benchmarks
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level and dispersion of tariﬀs and a removal of a large number of quantita-
tive restrictions (Chopra et al. 1995). Speciﬁc policy actions in a number of
areas—notably industrial deregulation, trade policy and public enterprise
reforms, and some aspects of ﬁnancial-sector reform—also formed the ba-
sis for a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan, as well as sector loans.
The government’s export-import policy plan (1992–97) ushered in radi-
cal changes to the trade regime by sharply reducing the role of the import
and export control system. The share of products subject to quantitative
restrictions decreased from 87 percent in 1987–88 to 45 percent in 1994–
95. The actual user condition on imports was discontinued. All twenty-six
import licensing lists were eliminated, and a negative list was established
(Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy, 2003). Thus, apart from goods in the neg-
ative list, all goods could be freely imported (subject to import tariﬀs;
Goldar 2002). In addition to the easing of import and export restrictions,
there were drastic tariﬀ reductions (ﬁgure 7.1, panels A and B). Average
tariﬀs fell from more than 80 percent in 1990 to 37 percent in 1996, and the
standard deviation of tariﬀs dropped by 50 percent during the same pe-
riod. The structure of protection across industries changed (ﬁgure 7.1,
panel G). Panel H of ﬁgure 7.1 shows the strikingly linear relationship be-
tween the prereform tariﬀ levels and the decline in tariﬀs the industry ex-
perienced. This graph reﬂects the guidelines according to which tariﬀ re-
form took place, namely reduction in the general level of tariﬀs, reduction
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Fig. 7.1 Evolution of tariﬀs in India: A, average nominal tariﬀs; B, standard devia-
tion of nominal tariﬀs; C, tariﬀs by broad industrial category; D, tariﬀs by indus-
trial use–based category; E, share of free HS lines by broad industrial category; F,
share of free HS lines by industrial use–based category; G, correlation of industry




Fig. 7.1 (cont.)of the spread or dispersion of tariﬀrates, simpliﬁcation of the tariﬀsystem,
and rationalization of tariﬀrates, along with the abolition of numerous ex-
emptions and concessions.4 Agricultural products, with the exception of
cereals and oilseeds, faced an equally sharp drop in tariﬀs, although the
nontariﬀ barriers (NTBs) of these products were lifted only in the late




Fig. 7.1 (cont.) Evolution of tariﬀs in India: A, average nominal tariﬀs; B, stan-
dard deviation of nominal tariﬀs; C, tariﬀs by broad industrial category; D, tariﬀs
by industrial use–based category; E, share of free HS lines by broad industrial cate-
gory; F, share of free HS lines by industrial use–based category; G, correlation of in-
dustry tariﬀs in 1997 and 1987; H, tariﬀ decline and industry tariﬀs in 1987
4. The guidelines were outlined in the Chelliah report of the Tax Reform Commission con-
stituted in 1991.G
H
Fig. 7.1 (cont.)tude of tariﬀ changes (and especially NTBs) according to industry use
type: consumer durables, consumer nondurables, capital goods, and inter-
mediate and basic goods (ﬁgure 7.1, panels D and F). Indian authorities
ﬁrst liberalized capital goods, basic goods, and intermediates, while con-
sumer nondurables and agricultural products were slowly moved from the
negative list to the list of freely importable goods only in the second half of
the 1990s. The Indian rupee was devalued 20 percent against the dollar in
July 1991 and further devalued in February 1992. By 1993, India had
adopted a ﬂexible exchange rate regime (Ahluwalia 1999).
Following the reduction in trade distortions, the ratio of total trade in
manufactures to GDP rose from an average of 13 percent in the 1980s to
nearly 19 percent of GDP in 1999–2000 (ﬁg. 7.2). Export and import vol-
umes also increased sharply from the early 1990s, outpacing growth in real
output (ﬁg. 7.2). India’s imports were signiﬁcantly more skilled-labor
intensive than India’s exports and remained so throughout the 1990s, as
shown in ﬁgure 7.3, which plots cumulative export and import shares byskill
intensity in 1987, 1991, 1994, and 1997.
India remained committed to further trade liberalization, and since 1997
there have been further adjustments to import tariﬀs. However, at the time the
government announced the export-import policy in the Ninth Plan (1997–
2002), the sweeping reforms outlined in the previous plan had been under-
taken and pressure for further reforms from external sources had abated.
7.3 Data
The data for this analysis were drawn from three main sources. House-
hold survey data are available from the 1983–84, 1987–88, 1993–94, and
1999–2000 (thick) rounds of the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS).
The NSS provides household-level information on expenditure patterns,
occupation, industrial aﬃliation (at the three-digit National Industrial
Classiﬁcation [NIC] level), and various other household and individual
characteristics. The surveys usually cover all states in India and collect in-
formation on about 75,000 rural and 45,000 urban households.5 Using
these data, I construct district-level measures of poverty (measured as head
count ratio and poverty gap) and inequality (measured as the standard de-
viation of the log of per capita expenditure and the logarithmic deviation
of per capita expenditure).6 Following Deaton (2003a, 2003b), I adjust
these estimates in two ways. First, I use the poverty lines proposed by
Deaton as opposed to the ones used by the Indian Planning Commission,
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5. The NSS follows the Indian census deﬁnition of urban and rural areas. To be classiﬁed
as urban, an area needs to meet several criteria regarding size and density of the population,
and the share of male working population engaged in nonagricultural pursuits.
6. The poverty measures are explained in detail in section 7.4.2. The head count ratio rep-
resents the proportion of the population below the poverty line, while the poverty gap index
is the normalized aggregate shortfall of poor people’s consumption from the poverty line.which are based on defective price indexes over time, across states, and be-
tween the urban and rural sectors. The poverty lines are available for the
sixteen bigger states in India and Delhi to which I restrict the analysis.7 In
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A
Fig. 7.2 Evolution of India’s trade: A, export, import, and output indexes (1978–
79   100); B, merchandise trade (in percent of GDP)
B
7. Poverty lines were not available for some of the smaller states and union territories, namely
Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Daman and Diu, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizo-
ram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Pondicherry,
Lakshwadweep, Dadra Nagar, and Haveli. The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these
states, with poverty lines assumed to be the same as those of the neighboring states.addition, the 1999–2000 round is not directly comparable to the 1993–94
round. The 1999–2000 round introduced a new recall period (seven days)
along with the usual thirty-day recall questions for the household expen-
ditures on food, pan, and tobacco. Due to the way the questionnaire was
administered, there are reasons to believe that this methodology leads to
an overestimate of the expenditures based on the thirty-day recall period,
which in turn aﬀects the poverty and inequality estimates. To achieve com-
parability with earlier rounds, I follow Deaton and impute the correct dis-
tribution of total per capita expenditure for each district from the house-
holds’ expenditures on a subset of goods for which the new recall period
questions were not introduced. The poverty and inequality measures were
derived from this corrected distribution. Throughout the 1990s there were
substantial changes in the administrative division of India, with districts’
boundaries changing as new districts were carved out of existing ones. As
I compare districts over time, I construct consistent time series of district
identiﬁers using census atlases and other maps of India. These were also
used to match the NSS and census district deﬁnitions.
For industrial data, I use the Indian census of 1991, which reports the in-
dustry of employment at the three-digit NIC code for each district in India.
Because the census does not distinguish among crops produced by agricul-
tural workers, I use the forty-third round of the NSS to compute agricultural
employment district weights. There are about 450 industry codes, of which
about 190 are traded agricultural, mining, or manufacturing industries.
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Fig. 7.3 Pattern of Indian trade, XM shares on skilled-unskilled ratio 90Finally, I use tariﬀs to measure changes in Indian trade policy. While
NTBs have historically played a large role in Indian trade policy, data are
not available at a disaggregated enough level to allow the construction of a
time series of NTBs across sectors.8 Instead, I construct a database of an-
nual tariﬀdata for 1987–2001 at the six-digit level of the Indian Trade Clas-
siﬁcation Harmonized System (HS) code based on data from various pub-
lications of the Ministry of Finance. I then match 5,000 product lines to the
NIC codes, using the concordance of Debroy and Santhanam (1993), to
calculate average industry-level tariﬀs. The few available data on NTBs
come from various publications of the Directorate General of Foreign
Trade as well as the 1992 study of the Indian trade regime by Aksoy (1992).
7.4 Empirical Strategy
The Indian liberalization was externally imposed and comprehensive,
and the Indian government had to meet strict compliance deadlines. The
period immediately before the reform and the ﬁve-year plan immediately
following give rise to an excellent natural experiment. India’s large size and
diversity (India was divided into approximately 450 districts in twenty-
seven states at the time of the 1991 census) allow for a cross-region research
design. The identiﬁcation strategy is straightforward: districts whose in-
dustries faced larger liberalization shocks are compared to those whose in-
dustries remained protected. Gordon Hanson employs a similar strategy in
his study of the eﬀect of globalization on labor income in Mexico in chap-
ter 10 of this volume.
However, unlike Hanson’s, the identiﬁcation strategy of this paper ex-
ploits variation in the “initial” industrial composition across districts in In-
dia and the timing of liberalization across industries. I construct a measure
of district trade exposure as the average of industry-level tariﬀs weighted
by the workers employed in that industry in 1991 as a share of all registered
workers. The variation in industrial composition will generate diﬀerential
response of the district-level trade exposure to the exogenous changes in
tariﬀs. In a regression framework, the baseline speciﬁcation takes the fol-
lowing form:
(1) y d,t      Tariﬀd,t    t    d   εd,t,
where y d,t is district-level outcome such as measures of poverty and in-
equality, and Tariﬀd,t is the district exposure to international trade. The co-
eﬃcient of interest,  , captures the average eﬀect of trade protection on
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8. In addition, the experience of other developing countries shows that NTB coverage ra-
tios are usually highly correlated with tariﬀs; thus, estimates based on tariﬀs may capture the
combined eﬀect of trade policy changes (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2004). This relationship
seems to hold in the case of India as well, based on the patchy data available.regional outcomes. The inclusion of district ﬁxed eﬀects ( d) absorbs un-
observed district-speciﬁc heterogeneity in the determinants of poverty and
inequality, while the year dummies ( t) control for macroeconomic shocks
that aﬀect all of India equally.
The above methodology will capture the short- to medium-run eﬀect of
trade liberalization in a speciﬁc district. Note that in the presence of per-
fect factor mobility across regions, one would expect no eﬀect of liberal-
ization on regional outcomes. If workers can easily migrate in response to
adverse price changes, the eﬀect of liberalization captured in   would be
zero. A further advantage of this identiﬁcation strategy is that it will un-
cover the general equilibrium eﬀect of trade liberalization within a geo-
graphical unit. Previous studies have focused on the eﬀect of trade open-
ing on manufacturing workers, who, in developing countries, typically
represent a small fraction of the population, though often a large share of
income. This strategy will capture the eﬀect of trade liberalization not only
on manufacturing and agricultural workers but also on their dependents
and individuals in allied sectors.
It is important to emphasize that this empirical strategy cannot tell us
anything about the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of trade on poverty. First, trade liber-
alization is likely to have eﬀects common across India, through prices,
availability of new goods, faster growth, and so on.9 Second, it would be
very diﬃcult to draw a causal lesson using only time variation in trade lib-
eralization and poverty levels, since the Indian economy was subject to nu-
merous other inﬂuences over the period studied. This study, based on re-
gional variation, does not reﬂect these eﬀects and does not seek to answer
questions about overall levels. Instead, it answers the question of whether
all districts derived similar beneﬁts (or suﬀered similar costs) from liberal-
ization or whether some areas suﬀered disproportionately. This is an im-
portant question for policymakers, who might need to devise additional
policies to redistribute some of the gains from the winners to those who do
not win as much in order to minimize potential social cost of inequality.
The balance of this section addresses two potential complications. First,
the process of trade liberalization is explored in detail, including the pos-
sibility that liberalization was correlated with other factors that aﬀect
regional poverty and inequality. Second, the measures used to quantify
poverty and inequality are described, including careful attention to pos-
sible problems with the data, and their solution.
7.4.1 Endogeneity of Trade Policy
There are strong theoretical reasons (Grossman and Helpman 2002) to
believe that in the absence of external pressure, trade policy is an endoge-
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9. To a certain extent the eﬀect of cheaper goods should be reﬂected in the deﬂators for the
poverty lines.nous outcome to political and economic processes. As the empirical strat-
egy of this paper exploits the interaction of regional industrial composition
and diﬀerential degree of liberalization across industries to identify the
eﬀect of trade liberalization on poverty and inequality, understanding the
source of variation in the tariﬀ levels is of utmost importance. In particu-
lar, there are two dimensions that suggest that endogeneity of trade policy
may be a concern. First, the initial decrease in tariﬀs might have been just
a continuation of a secular trend. The timing of trade reform might have
reﬂected Indian authorities’ perception of domestic industries as mature
enough to face foreign competition, and labor and credit markets as ﬂex-
ible enough to ease the intersectoral reallocation that would ensue. Sec-
ond, the cross-sectional variation in levels of protection might be related to
economic and political factors. The relatively less eﬃcient industries might
have enjoyed a higher degree of protection; the political strength of labor
as well as business is also often cited as a determinant of trade protection.
If less productive industries or industries with higher lobbying ability are
more concentrated in poorer areas, then one might see a positive correla-
tion between district poverty rates and the district level tariﬀs. These two
concerns are addressed in sequence below.
As already discussed in section 7.2, the external crisis of 1991 opened the
way for market-oriented reforms in India, such as trade liberalization. The
Indian government required IMF support to meet external payment obli-
gations, and was thus compelled to accept the conditions that accompa-
nied the support. Given several earlier attempts to avoid IMF loans and
the associated conditionalities, the large number of members of the new
cabinet who had been cabinet members in past governments with inward-
looking trade policies and the heavy reliance on tariﬀs as a source of rev-
enues, these reforms came as a surprise (Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy
2003). According to a study on the political economy of economic policy
in India, the new policy package was delivered swiftly in order to complete
the process of changeover so as not to permit consolidation of any likely
opposition to implementation of the new policies: “The strategy was to ad-
minister a ‘shock therapy’ to the economy....  T h e r e  w a s  n o  d e b a t e  among
oﬃcials or economists prior to the oﬃcial adoption....  T h e  new eco-
nomic policy did not originate out of an analysis of the data and informa-
tion or a well-thought-out development perspective” (Goyal 1996).10
Varshney (1999) describes the political environment in which the trade
reforms were passed. Mass political attention at the time was focused on
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10. This view is conﬁrmed in a recent interview with Dr. Raja Chelliah, one of the master-
minds of the reforms, who said, “We didn’t have the time to sit down and think exactly what
kind of a development model we needed....  T h e r e  w a s  n o  systematic attempt to see two
things; one, how have the beneﬁts of reforms distributed, and two, ultimately what kind of so-
ciety we want to have, what model of development should we have?” (July 5, 2004, http://in
.rediﬀ.com/money/2004/jul/05inter.htm).internal politics (ethnic conﬂict in particular), and trade reforms pushed
through by a weak coalition government apparently escaped general at-
tention, in contrast to the failed reform attempts of the much stronger
Congress Party in 1985. As late as 1996, fewer than 20 percent of the elec-
torate had any knowledge of the trade reform, while 80 percent had opin-
ions on whether India should implement caste-based aﬃrmative action.
While some liberalization eﬀorts (for example, privatization) were diluted
or delayed due to popular opposition, trade liberalization was generally
successful. As Bhagwati wrote, “Reform by storm has supplanted the re-
form by stealth of Mrs. Gandhi’s time and the reform with reluctance un-
der Rajiv Gandhi” (Bhagwati 1993).
There are several reasons why trade policy remained part of elite politics.
Trade constitutes a relatively small part of GDP in India. Although tariﬀs
were vastly reduced, consumer goods and agricultural products were ini-
tially not liberalized. And although there surely is an important link be-
tween mass welfare and trade policy, even when trade is a small share of the
national product, these links are subtle and not yet established empirically.
Even if the timing of the sharp drop in average tariﬀs (ﬁg. 7.1) appears
exogenous, there is signiﬁcant variation in the tariﬀ changes across indus-
tries, which could confound inference. More precisely, it is important to
understand whether the changes in tariﬀs reﬂected authorities’ percep-
tions of industry’s ability to compete internationally, or the lobbying power
of the industry. Ideally, this concern could be alleviated by knowledge of
the true intentions of Indian policymakers or, failing that, through a de-
tailed study of the political economy behind tariﬀchanges in India over the
period. In the absence of objective and detailed analyses of such policy
changes, the data may be examined for possible confounding relationships.
First, I examine to what extent tariﬀs moved together. An analysis of the
tariﬀ changes of the 5,000 items in the data set for 1992–96, the Eighth
Plan, and for 1997–2001, the Ninth Plan, suggests that movements in tar-
iﬀs were strikingly uniform until 1997 (ﬁg. 7.4). During the ﬁrst ﬁve-year
plan that incorporated the economic reforms of 1991, India had to meet
certain externally imposed benchmarks, and the majority of tariﬀ changes
across products exhibited similar behavior (either increased, decreased,
or remained constant). After 1997, tariﬀ movements were not as uniform.
This suggests that policymakers were more selective in setting product
tariﬀs during 1997–2001, and the problem of potential cross-sectional en-
dogenous trade protection is more pronounced.
Second, there is no evidence that policymakers adjusted tariﬀs accord-
ing to industry’s perceived productivity during the Eighth Plan (i.e., until
1997). In a related study (Topalova 2004a), I tested whether current pro-
ductivity levels predict future tariﬀs—a relationship one would expect if
policymakers were indeed trying to protect less eﬃcient industries. I found
that the correlation between future tariﬀs and current productivity, and fu-
306 Petia Topalovature tariﬀs and current productivity growth, is indistinguishable from zero
for the 1989–96 period. For the period after 1997, however, future tariﬀlev-
els seem to be negatively and statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with cur-
rent productivity. This evidence and the evidence on uniformity in tariﬀ
movements until 1997 suggest that it may not be appropriate to use trade
policy variation after 1997. This study thus focuses on the 1987–97 period.
A third check uses data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) to
test for political protection. Even if the change in industry tariﬀs appears
uncorrelated with the initial productivity of the industry, tariﬀs may be cor-
related with politically important characteristics of the ﬁrm. Using data
from the ASI (which covers manufacturing and mining sectors), and fol-
lowing the literature on political protection, I regress the change in tariﬀs
between 1987 and 1997 on various industrial characteristics in 1987.11
These characteristics include employment size (a larger labor force may
lead to more electoral power and more protection), output size, average
wage (policymakers may protect industries where relatively low-skilled or
vulnerable workers are employed), concentration (as measured by the av-
erage factory size, this captures the ability of producers to organize politi-
cal pressure groups to lobby for more protection), and share of skilled
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Fig. 7.4 Direction of tariﬀ changes
11. I use 1987 as the prereform year since the data on prereform poverty and inequality
come from the forty-third round of the NSS, which was collected in 1987. The results are ro-
bust to using 1988 or 1990 as the prereform year.workers. The results are presented in table 7.1, panel A. Tariﬀ changes are
not correlated with any of the industry characteristics.
Because agricultural workers are not included in the ASI data but com-
prise a large share of India’s population, I conduct a similar exercise using
data from the 1987 NSS. I estimate for all industries the average per capita
expenditure, wage, poverty rate, and poverty depth at the industry level,
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Table 7.1 Tariﬀ declines and prereform industrial characteristics (dependent variable:
Tariﬀ1987 – Tariﬀ1997)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Evidence from the ASI
Log real wage 0.037
(0.062)










Growth log output  –0.038
1982–87 (0.061)
Growth log employment  0.024
1982–87 (0.083)
R2 0.093 0.096 0.091 0.096 0.094 0.090 0.092 0.091
No. of observations 135 135 135 135 134 135 135 135
B. Evidence from the NSS, rural and urban pooled








R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06
No. of observations 315 274 315 315
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include indicators for industry use type:
capital goods, consumer durables, consumer nondurables, and intermediate. In panel A, regressions are
weighted by the square root of the number of factories. Data are from the 1987 ASI and cover mining
and manufacturing industries. In panel B, regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of
workers in each industry in the 1987 NSS. Urban and rural sample are pooled, and an indicator for ur-
ban is included. Separate regressions for the urban and rural sample exhibit similar patterns. Note that
cereal and oilseed cultivation has been treated as a nontraded industry, because imports of these agri-
cultural products were canalized (restricted only to state trading monopolies) until 2000.and I check whether there is a correlation between these industry charac-
teristics and tariﬀ declines. The results, presented in table 7.1, panel B,
show no signiﬁcant relationship between tariﬀchanges and these measures
of workers’ wellbeing, once controls for industry use type are included.
A possible explanation for these results can be found in Gang and
Pandey (1996). They conducted a careful study of the determinants of pro-
tection across manufacturing sectors across three plans, 1979–80, 1984–
85, and 1991–92, showing that none of the economic and political factors
are important in explaining industry tariﬀ levels in India.12 They explain
the phenomenon with the hysteresis of policy: trade policy was determined
in the Second Five-Year Plan and never changed, even as the circum-
stances and natures of the industries evolved.
The evidence presented here suggests that the diﬀerential tariﬀ changes
across industries between 1991 and 1997 were as unrelated to the state of
the industries as can be reasonably hoped for in a real-world setting.
One big exception to the otherwise haphazard pattern of tariﬀ reduc-
tions comprises two major agricultural crops: cereals and oilseeds.
Throughout the period of study, the imports of cereals and oilseeds re-
mained canalized (only government agencies were allowed to import these
items), and no change in their tariﬀ rates was observed (the tariﬀ rate for
cereals was set at zero). Thus, they were de facto nontraded goods. The de-
lay in the liberalization of these major agricultural crops was due to rea-
sons of food security. However, the cultivators of these crops were also
among the poorest in India. This brings some additional complications to
the analysis, which are discussed at length in the following sections.
7.4.2 Measurement and Basic Patterns of Poverty and Inequality
Measuring poverty and inequality is not a trivial task. For poverty, I use
both the head count ratio (HCR) and the poverty gap. The former, which I
refer to as the poverty rate, represents the proportion of the population be-
low the poverty line. While the HCR is widely used, it does not capture the
extent to which diﬀerent households fall short of the poverty line, and it is
highly sensitive to the number of poor households near the poverty line.
Thus, I also analyze the poverty gap index, deﬁned as the normalized ag-
gregate shortfall of poor people’s consumption from the poverty line.13
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12. In other developing countries, protection tends to be highest for unskilled, labor-
intensive sectors. See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001), Hanson and Harrison (1999), and Cur-
rie and Harrison (1997) for evidence from Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco, respectively.
13. Both the HCR and the poverty gap are members of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class
of poverty measures, deﬁned as P     ∫z
0 [(z – y)/z] f(y)dy, where z is the poverty line and in-
comes are distributed according to the density function f(y). The head count ratio is calcu-
lated by setting   to be 0, and the poverty gap by setting   to be 1. Since the survey design
changed for the 1999–2000 round of the NSS, in order to obtain internally consistent mea-
surements of poverty and inequality, the per capita expenditure data were adjusted at the dis-
trict level, following Deaton (2003a, 2003b; Deaton and Tarozzi 2005).Fig. 7.5 Trends in urban and rural poverty and inequality: A, evolution of the head
count ratio; B, evolution of the poverty gap; C, evolution of the log deviation of con-
sumption; D, evolution of the standard deviation of log consumption
Notes: Deaton’s adjusted poverty lines and price indexes were used (Deaton 2003a, 2003b;
Deaton and Tarozzi 2005). The 55th-round data were adjusted for the change in questionnaire
design.
Figure 7.5 plots the evolution of poverty in India, and indicates a substan-
tial decline over the past two decades.
I chose two measures of inequality, the standard deviation of log con-
sumption and the mean logarithmic deviation of consumption,14 both be-
cause they are standard measures and because similar values are obtained
when they are estimated from either the microdata or the estimated distri-
butions. In contrast to poverty’s steady decline, inequality follows a more
complicated pattern. Although it registered a substantial decline between
1987 and 1993, both measures record a break in that trend and a slight in-
crease in inequality after 1993 in rural India. In urban India, after a period
of decline, inequality rose between 1993 and 1999.
As mentioned above, the measure of trade policy is the tariﬀ that a dis-




14. The mean deviation of consumption is part of the family of generalized entropy coeﬃ-
cients. It is calculated according to the following formula:
I(0)    log   f(y)dy,






 ad valorem tariﬀ at time t.15 Appendix table 7A.1 provides summary sta-
tistics of the variables included in the analysis at the district level, includ-
ing a breakdown of the workers across broad industrial categories. In the
average rural district about 80 percent of main workers are involved in agri-
culture, of whom 87 percent are involved in cultivation of cereals and
oilseeds.16 Mining and manufacturing account for about 6 percent of the
workers, and the remaining 12 percent are involved in services, trade,
transportation, and construction. In urban India, agricultural workers
represent only 19 percent, of which 73 percent are cultivators of cereals
and oilseeds. Manufacturing and mining workers account for another ﬁfth
of the urban population, and the remaining three ﬁfths comprise workers
in services and the like.
The district level tariﬀs are computed as follows:
Tariﬀd,t  
Tariﬀd,t is a scaled version of district tariﬀs. In this measure, workers in
nontraded industries are assigned zero tariﬀ for all years. These are work-
ers in services, trade, transportation, and construction as well as all work-
ers involved in the growing of cereals and oilseeds. The latter assumption
is justiﬁed by the fact that all product lines of these two industries were
canalized (imports were allowed only to the state trading monopoly) as late
as 2000.17 Furthermore, the tariﬀs of all product lines under the growing-
of-cereals industry are zero throughout the entire period of interest.
One concern with the use of Tariﬀd,tis that it is very sensitive to the share
of people involved in nontraded industries, the majority of whom are the
cereal and oilseed growers. Since agricultural workers are usually at the
bottom of the income distribution, Tariﬀd,tis correlated with initial poverty
levels. The interpretation of results based on this measure may be unclear
if there were (for other reasons) convergence across districts. In particular,
poorer districts, which have a large fraction of agricultural workers, may
experience faster reduction in poverty due to mean reversion or conver-
gence. These districts may also record a lower drop in tariﬀs, since initially
∑i Workerd,i,1991   Tariﬀi,t    
Total Workerd,1991
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15. As described in the data section (7.3), the 1991 population and housing census is used
to compute employment by industry for each district. The employment data are available for
the urban and rural sectors separately by industry at the three-digit NIC level for all workers
except agricultural workers. To match agricultural workers to the tariﬀ data, I compute dis-
trict employment weights from the forty-third round of the NSS (July 1987–June 1988).
16. The 1991 Indian census divides workers into two categories: main and marginal work-
ers. Main workers include people who worked for six months or more during the year, while
marginal workers include those who worked for a shorter period. Unpaid farm and family en-
terprise workers are supposed to be included in either the main worker or marginal worker
category, as appropriate.
17. These products also have minimum support prices ﬁxed by the government of India.the Tariﬀd,t measure is low. Thus, one might ﬁnd a spurious negative rela-
tionship between tariﬀs and poverty and erroneously conclude that trade
liberalization led to a relative increase in poverty at the district level. Al-
ternatively, if workers in nontraded activities are on a diﬀerent growth path
than those in traded industries, Tariﬀd,t might capture this diﬀerential
growth rather than the eﬀect of trade policies. To overcome this shortcom-
ing, I instrument Tariﬀd,t with TrTariﬀd,t, deﬁned as
TrTariﬀd,t   .
TrTariﬀd,t, nonscaled tariﬀs, ignores the workers in nontraded industries. It
weighs industry tariﬀs with employment weights that sum to one for the
share of people in traded goods in each district. Thus, a district that has 1
percent workers in traded industries and another district where 100 per-
cent of workers are in traded industries will have the same value of Tr-
Tariﬀd,t if, within the traded industries, the industrial composition is the
same. Since the variation in TrTariﬀd,tdoes not reﬂect the size of the traded
sector within a district, the non-scaled tariﬀwould overstate the magnitude
of any eﬀect trade policy might have. Yet TrTariﬀd,t forms a good instru-
ment, as it is strongly correlated with the scaled tariﬀs and overcomes the
correlation with district initial poverty that is there by construction in
Tariﬀd,t. Table 7.2 presents the results from the ﬁrst stage. Following equa-
tion (1), I estimate the following speciﬁcation:
(2) Tariﬀd,t      TrTariﬀd,t    t    d   εd,t,
with  tand  ddeﬁned as above. Columns (1) and (3) present the correlation
between the scaled and nonscaled tariﬀs. There is a very strong relation-
∑i Workerd,i,1991   Tariﬀi,t    
∑i Workerd,i,1991
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Table 7.2 First stage: Relationship between scaled and nonscaled tariﬀs (dependent
variable: Tariﬀ)
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TrTariﬀ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.089) (0.091) (0.150)
TrTariﬀ   Post 0.288∗∗∗ 0.214∗
(0.051) (0.118)
R2 0.84 0.86 0.91 0.91
No. of observations 728 728 724 724
Notes:All regressions include year and district dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
corrected for clustering at the state year level. Regressions are weighted by the square root of
the number of people in a district.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.ship between the nonscaled and scaled tariﬀs in both urban and rural
India.
Another instrument is suggested by ﬁgure 7.1, panel G: tariﬀ changes
are linearly related to initial tariﬀs. One important principle in the tariﬀ
changes was to standardize the tariﬀs (reduce the standard deviation). A
natural consequence of this is that the higher the tariﬀ initially, the greater
the reduction. Thus, I use prereform unscaled tariﬀs times a post dummy, in
addition to the unscaled tariﬀs, as instruments for tariﬀ reduction, namely:
(3) Tariﬀd,t      TrTariﬀd,t    Postt   TrTariﬀd,1987    t    d   εd,t
Columns (2) and (4) of table 7.2 include the interaction of the initial un-
scaled tariﬀ and a postliberalization dummy. The interaction of the non-
scaled tariﬀs times a post dummy is also strongly correlated with the scaled
tariﬀs and adds explanatory power in all rural subsamples. In the urban
sector, the relationship is not as strong.
Data on outcome variables are available for three years—1987, 1993,
and 1999—while tariﬀ data are available annually. It is not known how
soon national policy changes aﬀect regional outcomes, although there is
probably some lag. If the 1993 outcomes were matched to the 1991 tariﬀs,
1993 would count as a pre year, while if they were matched to the 1992
tariﬀs, it would be a post year. To avoid this problem, 1993 is omitted from
the analysis. I use the earliest available data, 1987, for the prereform tariﬀ
measure, and the 1997 data as the post measure.
7.5 Results
I estimate four versions of equation (1): the ordinary least squares (OLS)
relationship using Tariﬀd,t; a reduced form using TrTariﬀd,t; instrumenting
for c using TrTariﬀd,t; and ﬁnally instrumenting for Tariﬀd,t with both Tr-
Tariﬀd,t and with TrTariﬀd,1987   Postt, where Postt is a dummy equal to 1 in
year 1999. Since the dependent variable is an estimate, I weight the obser-
vations by the square root of the average number of households in a district
across rounds. Year dummies are included to account for macroeconomic
shocks and time trends that aﬀect outcomes equally across India, while dis-
trict ﬁxed eﬀects absorb district-speciﬁc time-invariant heterogeneity. Out-
comes of districts within a state might be correlated, since industrial com-
position may be correlated within a state; thus, I cluster the standard errors
at the state year level. The results for the four outcomes of interest are pre-
sented in table 7.3: those for rural India in columns (1)–(4) and those for
urban India in columns (5)–(8). Each panel gives the results for a diﬀerent
dependent variable. Columns (1) and (5) give the OLS relationship, col-
umns (2) and (6) the reduced form, and columns (3), (4), (7), and (8), the
instrumental variables (IV) results. In columns (4) and (8), I use both the
unscaled tariﬀs and the prereform unscaled tariﬀs times a postreform
dummy as an instrument.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.In rural India, for both measures of poverty, there is a strong statistically
signiﬁcant negative relationship between district-level tariﬀs and poverty.
The decline in tariﬀs as a result of the sharp trade liberalization appears to
have led to a relative increase in the poverty rate and poverty gap in districts
whose exposure to liberalization was more intense. The average district ex-
perienced a 5.5 percentage point reduction in the scaled district tariﬀs. The
point estimates of the various speciﬁcations are similar and suggest that
this 5.5 percentage point drop would lead to an increase in the poverty rate
of 3.2 to 4.6 percentage points, and a 1.1 to 1.8 percentage point increase
in the poverty gap. Given that poverty rate in the average district decreased
by 12.7 percentage points and that poverty gap decreased by 4 percentage
points during the entire decade, the eﬀects of exposure to liberalization are
rather large. Surprisingly, there is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between trade exposure and poverty in urban India. Although the point es-
timates are still negative, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is much smaller
than in rural India. There is no statistically signiﬁcant relationship be-
tween trade liberalization and either measure of inequality for the average
district in either rural or urban India.
7.5.1 Why Rural?
The empirical literature on trade liberalization so far has focused pre-
dominantly on the manufacturing sector and urban areas because these
were the areas most commonly aﬀected by trade liberalization (Goldberg
and Pavcnik 2004). Thus, it is rather surprising that the eﬀect of trade lib-
eralization on districts is more pronounced in rural India than in urban
India.18 A close look at the evolution of tariﬀ barriers and NTBs in ﬁgure
7.1 suggests an explanation. Agriculture was not omitted from the 1991 re-
forms in India. Tariﬀs of agricultural products fell in line with tariﬀs of
manufacturing and other goods. While quantity restrictions and licensing
requirements on both the import and export of agricultural products (out
of a concern for food security) were removed later than on other goods, the
share of agricultural products that could be freely imported jumped from
7 percent in 1989 to 40 percent in 1998. Between 1998 and 2001 this num-
ber reached more than 80 percent.
In addition, the agricultural tariﬀs and NTBs are strongly correlated.
The postliberalization data (the ﬁfty-ﬁfth round of the NSS) was collected
from mid-1999 to mid-2000, right when the bulk of the removal of NTBs
was taking place. Thus, the tariﬀ measure may be capturing the eﬀect of
both tariﬀ barriers and NTBs and reﬂect the short-term eﬀect of the
change in relative price of agricultural products on the extensive rural pop-
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18. On the other hand, rural areas are where the poor people in India are concentrated. On
the eve of the 1991 reforms, both poverty rates and poverty depth were almost double in ru-
ral areas (40 versus 22.8 percent poverty rate and 9 versus 4.7 percent poverty depth).ulation. I construct separate measures of agricultural tariﬀs and mining
and manufacturing tariﬀs that a district faces and regress district poverty
and inequality on these measures of trade policy. Appendix table 7A.2 re-
veals that the results are driven by agricultural tariﬀs.19 There is little rela-
tionship between mining and manufacturing tariﬀs and district outcomes,
although, due to the large standard errors of the point estimates, I can not
reject for any of the outcomes and for any of the subsamples that the eﬀect
of mining and manufacturing tariﬀs and of agricultural tariﬀs is the same.
The ﬁnding is not that surprising; manufacturing and mining workers rep-
resent only 6 percent of workers in the typical rural district—thus, it is
plausible that even if trade liberalization had a sizable eﬀect on their well-
being or relative earnings, it would not be reﬂected in district-level out-
comes.
Furthermore, people involved in agriculture are the most vulnerable, of-
ten with little access to insurance devices. There is no shortage of press ac-
counts of farmers committing suicide in the face of adverse shocks in In-
dia. Manufacturing workers, on the other hand, tend to be relatively richer
than agricultural workers: signiﬁcant decline in income may not be enough
to push them below the poverty line.
7.5.2 Robustness
The eﬀects of liberalization identiﬁed in this paper could be incorrect if
measures of trade liberalization were correlated with omitted time-varying
variables that aﬀect poverty and inequality. In this section, I ﬁrst examine
whether districts with diﬀerent initial industrial compositions were on
diﬀerent growth paths. I then determine whether preexisting conditions
within districts are correlated with subsequent tariﬀ changes. Finally, I
measure whether initial (1987) conditions other than industrial composi-
tion in districts are correlated with subsequent changes in poverty and, if
so, whether they are driving the results.
To address the concern that districts with diﬀerent industrial composi-
tion may be experiencing diﬀerent time trends in poverty and inequality
that are (spuriously) correlated with tariﬀchanges, I perform a falsiﬁcation
test. In particular, I test whether changes in poverty and inequality in the
two periods prior to the reform (from 1983 to 1987) are correlated with
measures of trade liberalization from 1987 to 1997.20 I use the four speciﬁ-
cations (OLS, reduced form, and both IV speciﬁcations), but now using
1983 and 1987 outcomes as pre and post, rather than the 1987 and 1999
outcomes. The results are presented in table 7.4. In both urban and rural
316 Petia Topalova
19. Note that the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients in appendix table 7A.2 are not inter-
pretable, as the measures of agricultural and mining and manufacturing tariﬀs are not scaled
by the share of population employed in the particular sector.
20. Note that the analysis can be performed only at the region level, as district identiﬁers





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.areas, there seems to be no correlation between tariﬀ changes and the pre-
reform trend in any of the outcomes.
In tables 7.5 and 7.6, I investigate the possibility that the results might be
driven by convergence or omitted variables.21 I control for time-varying
eﬀect of various prereform district characteristics as well as initial levels of
outcomes, by including the interaction of these initial characteristics and a
postliberalization dummy, estimating:
(4) y d,t      Tariﬀd,t    Postt   Xd,1987    t    d   εd,t
In all speciﬁcations I include in Xd,1987 initial industrial composition in
the district (namely, percentage of workers in agriculture, manufacturing,
mining, trade, transport, and services; workers in construction are the
omitted category), percentage literate, and the share of scheduled caste
and scheduled tribes population. I sequentially add as controls the initial
level of the log of mean per capita expenditure in the district, the prereform
trend in the outcome variable (the diﬀerence between its 1983 and 1987
value), and ﬁnally the initial value of the dependent variable itself instru-
mented by its value in 1983. I also allow for diﬀerential time trends in dis-
trict outcomes across states with pro-employer, pro-worker, and neutral la-
bor laws by including post times labor law ﬁxed eﬀects.22 In columns (1)–
(4), I use only TrTariﬀd,tas an instrument for Tariﬀd,t, while in columns (5)–
(8), I instrument the scaled tariﬀ with both TrTariﬀd,t and the initial level
interacted with a postliberalization dummy. Columns (4) and (8) include
the instrumented value of the lagged dependent variable, where the 1983
level is used as an instrument for the 1987 level.23
The inclusion of district initial characteristics does not substantially
change the results at the district level. Controlling for initial per capita ex-
penditure or prereform outcome reduces the size of the point estimates
(from 0.8 to 0.44 for poverty rate and from 0.32 to 0.12 for poverty gap
when the nonscaled tariﬀ is the only instrument, and from 0.68 to 0.45 for
poverty rate and from 0.21 to 0.12 for poverty gap when both the nonscaled
tariﬀ and its initial level are used as instruments). It may be that some of
the variation in poverty depth and incidence that equation (1) attributed to
trade liberalization was in fact due to convergence. According to these cor-
rected estimates, the decline in tariﬀs increased relative poverty incidence
by about 2 and poverty gap by 0.6 percentage points in the average district.
I also address the concern that some other reforms concurrent with trade
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21. I present the analysis only for the rural sample from now on, as the eﬀect of trade lib-
eralization in the urban sector cannot be precisely estimated.
22. Indian states are classiﬁed as having pro-worker, neutral, or pro-employer labor laws by
Besley and Burgess (2004).
23. Including the actual value would be equivalent to regressing changes on levels: if there
is mean reversion and measurement error, the coeﬃcient could be biased. In fact, the size of
the coeﬃcient on the initial level of the outcomes suggests implausibly strong convergence.Table 7.5 Eﬀect of trade liberalization on poverty and inequality in rural India controlling for
initial characteristics and other reforms (district level)
IV-TrTariﬀ IV-TrTariﬀ, Init TrTariﬀ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Dependent variable: Poverty rate
Tariﬀ Measure –0.607∗∗∗ –0.434∗∗ –0.441 –0.444∗∗ –0.418∗∗∗ –0.426∗∗∗ –0.522∗∗ –0.456∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.217) (0.281) (0.208) (0.141) (0.163) (0.206) (0.134)
Logmean 0.469∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.044) (0.034) (0.041)
Trend –0.322∗∗∗ –0.322∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.067)
Lagged 43 –0.419∗∗∗ –0.417∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.120)
B. Dependent variable: Poverty gap
Tariﬀ Measure –0.235∗∗∗ –0.175∗∗∗ –0.196∗∗ –0.118∗ –0.121∗∗ –0.124∗∗ –0.177∗∗ –0.118∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.066) (0.090) (0.069) (0.062) (0.063) (0.080) (0.041)
Logmean 0.161∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)
Trend –0.319∗∗∗ –0.318∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064)
Lagged 43 –0.576∗∗∗ –0.576∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.131)
C. Dependent variable: StdLog consumption
Tariﬀ Measure –0.192 –0.244 –0.268 –0.057 –0.083 –0.078 –0.175 0.006
(0.258) (0.260) (0.249) (0.232) (0.197) (0.203) (0.187) (0.202)
Logmean –0.140∗∗∗ –0.047 –0.136∗∗∗ –0.045
(0.035) (0.040) (0.035) (0.041)
Trend –0.635∗∗∗ –0.635∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.063)
Lagged 43 –0.382 –0.410
(0.278) (0.261)
D. Dependent variable: Log deviation of consumption
Tariﬀ Measure –0.009 –0.037 –0.095 0.044 –0.005 –0.004 –0.079 0.020
(0.131) (0.120) (0.098) (0.108) (0.081) (0.082) (0.074) (0.097)
Logmean –0.078∗∗∗ –0.031∗ –0.077∗∗∗ –0.030
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Trend –0.584∗∗∗ –0.584∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.100)
Lagged 43 –0.570∗ –0.547∗
(0.309) (0.309)
Notes: No. of observations   725. All regressions include year, district dummies, and state labor law year dummies, as
well as prereform literacy, share of SC/ST population, and industrial structure, which are interacted with a post dummy.
Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people in a district or region. The data are from the 43rd
and 55th rounds of the NSS. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the state year level. In col-
umns (1)–(4), the district tariﬀ is instrumented by the nonscaled tariﬀ. In columns (5)–(8), the district tariﬀ is instru-
mented by the nonscaled tariﬀ and the interaction of prereform nonscaled tariﬀ and a post dummy. In columns (4) and
(8) the level of the lagged dependent variable is instrumented with the value of the dependent variables in 1983.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 7.6 Eﬀect of trade liberalization on poverty and inequality in rural India controlling for
initial characteristics and other reform (district level)
IV-TrTariﬀ IV-TrTariﬀ, Init TrTariﬀ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Dependent variable: Poverty rate
Tariﬀ Measure –0.573∗∗∗ –0.446∗∗ –0.428 –0.447∗∗ –0.413∗∗∗ –0.402∗∗∗ –0.495∗∗ –0.445∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.201) (0.274) (0.202) (0.149) (0.152) (0.203) (0.129)
Logmean 0.485∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.043) (0.033) (0.040)
Trend –0.310∗∗∗ –0.310∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068)
Lagged 43 –0.441∗∗∗ –0.441∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.133)
FDI opened –0.051 –0.215∗∗∗ –0.134∗ –0.152∗∗∗ –0.055 –0.216∗∗∗ –0.132∗ –0.152∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.057) (0.073) (0.055) (0.059) (0.054) (0.069) (0.052)
License industries 0.008 0.050 0.069 0.020 0.012 0.051 0.067 0.021
(0.059) (0.077) (0.074) (0.074) (0.059) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073)
Bank branches per capita 3,802∗∗∗ 1,013 1,285 1,293 3,787∗∗∗ 1,001 1,304 1,291
(789) (766) (861) (1,125) (771) (770) (894) (1,117)
B. Dependent variable: Poverty gap
Tariﬀ Measure –0.224∗∗∗ –0.181∗∗∗ –0.190∗∗ –0.118 –0.122∗ –0.117∗ –0.169∗∗ –0.115∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.069) (0.093) (0.073) (0.066) (0.063) (0.082) (0.042)
Logmean 0.166∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
Trend –0.313∗∗∗ –0.312∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.063)
Lagged 43 –0.604∗∗∗ –0.607∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.147)
FDI opened industries –0.008 –0.064∗∗∗ –0.028 –0.039∗∗ –0.011 –0.066∗∗∗ –0.028 –0.040∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.024) (0.015)
License industries –0.002 0.012 0.021 0.005 0.000 0.014 0.022 0.005
(0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
Bank branches per capita 1,213∗∗∗ 260 330 115 1,204∗∗∗ 242 324 110
(232) (224) (267) (366) (224) (219) (268) (342)
C. Dependent variable: Log deviation of consumption
Tariﬀ Measure –0.175 –0.213 –0.244 –0.066 –0.061 –0.063 –0.162 0.004
(0.255) (0.260) (0.251) (0.228) (0.201) (0.208) (0.193) (0.204)
Logmean –0.147∗∗∗ –0.050 –0.142∗∗∗ –0.048
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039)
Trend –0.622∗∗∗ –0.622∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.068)
Lagged 43 –0.316 –0.356
(0.324) (0.295)
FDI opened industries –0.089∗ –0.040 –0.054 –0.054 –0.092∗ –0.045 –0.057 –0.051
(0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.053) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052)
License industries 0.067 0.054 0.033 0.037 0.070 0.059 0.035 0.035
(0.042) (0.045) (0.051) (0.052) (0.044) (0.046) (0.052) (0.051)
Bank branches per capita 1,119 1,964∗ 1,249 1,090 1,109 1,922∗ 1,226 1,081
(1,057) (1,091) (964) (1,032) (1,075) (1,109) (962) (1,042)
D. Dependent variable: Log deviation of consumption
Tariﬀ Measure –0.002 –0.022 –0.089 0.040 0.008 0.007 –0.070 0.021
(0.119) (0.116) (0.097) (0.104) (0.081) (0.083) (0.076) (0.095)
Logmean –0.078∗∗∗ –0.029∗ –0.077∗∗∗ –0.028∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)liberalization may be driving the results. In particular, in 1991 the govern-
ment of India increased the number of de-licensed industries and speciﬁed
a list of industries for automatic approval for foreign direct investment
(FDI).24 Substantial reforms were initiated in the ﬁnancial and banking
sector as well. Following the same methodology as in the construction of
district tariﬀs, I construct district employment-weighted share of license-
industries and district employment-weighted share of industries that are
open to FDI.25 The number of bank branches per capita in a district cap-
tures the potentially confounding eﬀect of banking reforms.26
In table 7.6, I replicate the speciﬁcations presented in table 7.5 including
these time-varying district-level measures of reforms. The eﬀect of trade
liberalization on poverty is completely insensitive to the additional con-
trols. There is no correlation between poverty and the number of bank
branches per capita or share of industries under a license. A larger share of
industries open to FDI, however, is associated with faster reduction in
poverty. As globalization is typically deﬁned as not only trade liberaliza-
tion but also opening to foreign investment, it is important to emphasize
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Table 7.6 (continued)
IV-TrTariﬀ IV-TrTariﬀ, Init TrTariﬀ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Trend –0.579∗∗∗ –0.579∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.102)
Lagged 43 –0.492 –0.463
(0.404) (0.388)
FDI opened industries –0.055∗∗ –0.029 –0.039 –0.023 –0.056∗∗ –0.030 –0.039 –0.025
(0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.033) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.032)
License industries 0.044∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.024 0.013 0.044∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.025 0.015
(0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.026)
Bank branches per capita 258 704 423 251 257 696 418 253
(510) (518) (436) (458) (509) (519) (436) (455)
Note: See notes to table 7.5.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
24. Foreign investment was tightly regulated prior to 1991. Foreign companies needed to
obtain speciﬁc prior approval from the Indian government, and foreign investment was lim-
ited to 40 percent. In 1991, the government created a list of high technology and high invest-
ment-priority industries with automatic permission for foreign equity share up to 51 percent.
Over the 1990s this list was gradually expanded.
25. Data on policies regarding industrial delicensing and opening to FDI were compiled
from various publications of the Reserve Bank of India Handbook of Industrial Statistics.
26. The Indian government heavily regulates private and public banks, as it considers the
banking system an integral tool in its eﬀorts to meet a number of social goals, such as poverty
reduction. Indeed, Burgess and Pande (2005) have shown that rural bank branch expansion
over the 1980s led to reduction in poverty.this ﬁnding. It also reconciles Hanson’s conclusion in chapter 10 of this
volume, which employs similar methodology, that more globalized areas in
Mexico experienced a larger increase in labor income with the ﬁnding that
trade liberalization slowed poverty reduction in more exposed districts in
India. Hanson’s deﬁnition of exposure to globalization takes into account
the share of maquiladora value added in state GDP, the share of FDI in
state GDP, and the share of imports and exports in state GDP, while the
main ﬁndings of this study concern the consequences of tariﬀ liberaliza-
tion.
In appendix table 7A.3 I investigate the role of imports versus exports, in
addition to FDI, by including the district employment-weighted industry
imports and exports. I use 1987 import/export data for the prereform pe-
riod, and the 1993–97 annual average for the postreform period. Since im-
ports and exports are the endogenous response to trade policy, exchange
rate shocks, foreign demand, and so on, these regressions do not warrant a
causal interpretation, yet they illustrate that imports are associated with
higher, and exports with lower, incidence of poverty. These correlations are
in line with the ﬁndings in Goldberg and Pavcnik’s study in chapter 6 of this
volume. Goldberg and Pavcnik investigate the eﬀect of Colombia’s trade
liberalization on urban unemployment, informality, minimum wage com-
pliance, and poverty, by exploiting variation in the timing and magnitude
of tariﬀreductions across manufacturing sectors. While they ﬁnd no robust
relationship between tariﬀ changes and various labor market outcomes,
higher exposure to import competition is associated with greater likeli-
hood of unemployment, informality, and poverty, while higher exports
correlate with lower informality, lower poverty, and better minimum wage
compliance.
7.6 Discussion and Conclusion
So far this paper has established that, whatever the India-wide eﬀects of
trade liberalization were, rural areas with a high concentration of indus-
tries that were disproportionately aﬀected by tariﬀ reductions experienced
slower progress in poverty reduction. However, for these areas, there was
no discernible eﬀect on inequality.
The regionally disparate eﬀects of liberalization are not consistent with
standard trade theory. In the hypothetical world of a standard trade model,
with perfect factor mobility across regions, labor would migrate in re-
sponse to wage and price shocks, equalizing the incidence of poverty across
regions. Estimating equation (1) would yield an estimate of  equal to zero,
indicating that the local intensity of liberalization has no eﬀect on local
poverty.
The interpretation of estimates of equation (1) as eﬀects of liberalization
on regional outcomes is correct only if labor is immobile across geograph-
322 Petia Topalovaical districts within India in the short to medium run—that is, if each dis-
trict represents a separate labor market. While this represents an immedi-
ate departure from standard trade theory, the assumption is realistic for the
case of India: the absence of mobility is striking. Moreover, the pattern of
migration has remained remarkably constant through time, with no visible
increase after the economic reforms of 1991.
Table 7.7presents some estimates of migration for urban and rural India
based on the three rounds of the NSS (1983, 1987, and 1999) that included
questions on the migration particurlars of household members. Overall
migration is not low; 20 to 23 percent of rural and 31 to 33 percent of ur-
ban residents have changed location of residence at least once in their life-
time. Most migrants are women relocating at marriage: around 40 percent
of females in rural and urban India report a change in location, versus 7
percent of men in rural and 26 percent of men in urban locations. However,
the migration most relevant for this study is short-run movement (within
the past ten years) of people across district boundaries or within district
across diﬀerent sectors (i.e., from an urban area to a rural one, or vice
versa). Only 3 to 4 percent of people living in rural areas reported chang-
ing either district or sector within the past ten years. Again, the percentage
of women so doing is double the share of men. For people living in urban
areas, the percentage of migrants is substantially higher. Yet less than 0.5
percent of the population in rural and 4 percent of the population in urban
areas moved for economic considerations (or employment).
These low migration ﬁgures, combined with a second characteristic of
India’s economy—namely, the large and growing disparities in income
across Indian states—challenge the standard theoretical framework.
Ahluwalia (2002), Datt and Ravallion (2002), Sachs, Bajpai, and Ramiath
(2002), Bandyopadhyay (2003), and others document signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences in the level of state GDP per capita and growth rate of state output.
Even if there is little migration across districts, there could be high levels
of reallocation within districts across industries. In a related study (Topa-
lova 2004b) I examine whether, as standard trade theory predicts, there
is intersectoral reallocation of labor and capital. There is no evidence of
signiﬁcant reallocation in the sample of all Indian states, although in the
sample of Indian states with ﬂexible labor laws, employment is positively
correlated with industry tariﬀs.27 This correlation is consistent with previ-
ous ﬁndings of faster growth of output and employment (Besley and
Burgess 2004) and a higher elasticity of labor demand with respect to out-
put price in states with ﬂexible labor laws (Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy
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27. Besley and Burgess (2004) classify Indian states as pro-worker, pro-employer, or neu-
tral, based on amendments of the Industrial Disputes Act. Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy
(2003) combine these categories with the ranking of the investment climate in Indian states
from a survey of managers conducted by the World Bank, in order to classify states as having























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































62003). My study (Topalova 2004b) also examines whether these diﬀerences
in the institutional environment and microeconomic ﬂexibility aﬀected the
impact of liberalization: the most pronounced eﬀects on poverty occurred
in areas with inﬂexible labor laws (those that saw no change in industrial
structure in response to trade liberalization) while inequality rose as a re-
sult of trade liberalization in areas with ﬂexible labor laws.
My study (Topalova 2004b) further investigates whether the adjustment
came through the price system, by looking at the eﬀect of tariﬀ changes on
wages and wage premia, and ﬁnds substantial adjustment in wages and in-
dustry premia, including industry premia of agricultural workers. In chap-
ter 8 in this volume Goh and Javorcik ﬁnd that in Poland, workers in sec-
tors with the largest tariﬀ declines experienced the highest increase in
wages; in India, these workers suﬀered the highest relative decrease in wage
premia. Goh and Javorcik posit that in Poland’s case, ﬁrms responded to
higher import competition by increasing productivity and rewarded the in-
creased labor productivity with higher wages. I ﬁnd similar results in India
(Topalova 2004a): microevidence suggests that ﬁrms in industries that were
relatively more liberalized experienced higher productivity and productiv-
ity growth. However, in India, these trade-induced productivity increases
were probably not shared with the workers or were insuﬃcient to oﬀset the
relative downward pressure on factor returns.
The mechanisms discussed above are consistent with a speciﬁc factor
model of trade in which labor is the speciﬁc factor in the short run. Rigid
labor markets fostered by labor market regulations in parts of India pre-
vented the reallocation of factors in the face of trade liberalization in those
areas. Changes in relative output prices led to changes in relative sector re-
turns to the speciﬁc factors. As those employed in traded industries were
not at the top of the income distribution on the eve of the trade reform, the
relative fall in wages contributed to the slower poverty reduction. This
eﬀect was aggravated by the slower overall growth in registered manufac-
turing employment in areas with inﬂexible labor laws, which retarded the
pull out of poverty of the poorest subsistence farmers. In contrast, areas in
which reallocation was easier and growth was faster (because of labor laws)
were shielded from the eﬀect of trade liberalization. In those areas, the
changes in the income distribution seem to have taken place in the high
end, as some workers tapped into the beneﬁts of liberalization, thereby in-
creasing the consumption inequality.
This is the ﬁrst study (to my knowledge) to document such a relationship
between trade liberalization and poverty within a developing or developed
country. The ﬁndings are important from a policy perspective as an in-
creasing number of developing countries pursue policies of trade liberal-
ization, hoping to boost economic growth, raise living standards, and re-
duce poverty. This paper does not measure the overall eﬀect of trade
liberalization on income growth and poverty alleviation. There was a sub-
Trade Liberalization, Poverty, and Inequality 325stantial reduction in poverty in India over the 1990s, which trade reforms
may have boosted or slowed down. This paper establishes that diﬀerent re-
gions within India experienced diﬀerential eﬀects of trade liberalization.
Those areas that were more exposed to potential foreign competition did
not reap as much of the beneﬁt (or bore a disproportionate share of the
burden) of liberalization in terms of poverty reduction.
A critical component to the ﬁndings of this study, as well as the study on
Colombia in this volume, is the absence of labor mobility in the short to
medium run. Workers do not relocate from sectors that should be con-
tracting to those that should be expanding fast enough, thus impeding one
of the main mechanisms that generate beneﬁts from trade. Enhancing la-
bor mobility will likely minimize the adjustment costs to trade opening.
This study presents some evidence to this eﬀect: the impact of trade on rel-
ative poverty in India was most pronounced in areas with inﬂexible labor
laws, where labor mobility was hindered. If some of the immobility of la-
bor is institutionally driven, then complementary measures to trade open-
ing, such as labor market reform, can ease the shock of liberalization and
minimize its unequalizing eﬀects.
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Appendix
Table 7A.1 Summary statistics
Rural Urban
No. of  Standard  No. of  Standard 
Variable observations Mean deviation observations Mean deviation
A. 38th round 1983
Poverty rate 368 0.429 0.173 372 0.439 0.147
Poverty gap 379 0.117 0.067 372 0.122 0.051
Standard deviation of 
log consumption 379 0.497 0.061 372 0.540 0.065
Logarithmic deviation 379 0.137 0.037 372 0.163 0.042
Tariﬀ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
TrTariﬀ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Agricultural tariﬀ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mining and 
manufacturing tariﬀ n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
B. 43rd round 1987
Poverty rate 379 0.368 0.196 366 0.248 0.168
Poverty gap 379 0.088 0.064 366 0.057 0.050
Standard deviation of 
log consumption 379 0.456 0.085 366 0.501 0.113
Logarithmic deviation 379 0.120 0.046 366 0.149 0.076
Poverty gap change in 
the 1980s 379 –0.029 0.062 364 –0.064 0.049Trade Liberalization, Poverty, and Inequality 327
Table 7A.1 (continued)
Rural Urban
No. of  Standard  No. of  Standard 
Variable observations Mean deviation observations Mean deviation
Poverty rate change in 
the 1980s 379 –0.061 0.164 364 –0.191 0.145
Standard deviation 
change in the 1980s 379 –0.040 0.081 364 –0.038 0.115
Log deviation change in 
the 1980s 379 –0.017 0.048 364 –0.013 0.080
Tariﬀ 364 0.081 0.080 362 0.172 0.085
TrTariﬀ 364 0.883 0.096 362 0.891 0.083
Agricultural tariﬀ 364 0.822 0.142 362 0.782 0.090
Mining and 
manufacturing tariﬀ 364 0.914 0.043 362 0.923 0.576
Log mean per capita 
expenditure 379 5.065 0.252 366 5.389 0.274
Percent literate 364 0.368 0.137 362 0.591 0.094
Percent SC/ST 364 0.293 0.161 362 0.154 0.064
Percent farmers 364 0.816 0.103 362 0.194 0.101
Percent manufacturing 364 0.056 0.045 362 0.191 0.088
Percent mining 364 0.005 0.014 362 0.013 0.041
Percent service 364 0.065 0.037 362 0.264 0.073
Percent trade 364 0.032 0.020 362 0.217 0.045
Percent transport 364 0.013 0.011 362 0.073 0.025
C. 50th round 1993
Poverty rate 366 0.313 0.179 354 0.191 0.098
Poverty gap 366 0.067 0.052 354 0.039 0.027
Standard deviation 
of log consumption 366 0.428 0.088 368 0.539 0.056
Logarithmic deviation 366 0.105 0.048 368 0.166 0.038
Tariﬀ 364 0.072 0.074 362 0.156 0.079
TrTariﬀ 364 0.778 0.095 362 0.812 0.082
Agricultural tariﬀ 364 0.632 0.130 362 0.635 0.089
Mining and 
manufacturing tariﬀ 364 0.825 0.054 362 0.837 0.063
D. 55th round 1999
Poverty rate 364 0.241 0.138 360 0.145 0.108
Poverty gap 364 0.048 0.035 360 0.029 0.027
Standard deviation of 
log consumption 364 0.463 0.106 360 0.529 0.091
Logarithmic deviation 364 0.116 0.042 360 0.157 0.054
Tariﬀ 364 0.026 0.022 362 0.060 0.030
TrTariﬀ 364 0.306 0.060 362 0.317 0.044
Agricultural tariﬀ 364 0.236 0.076 362 0.212 0.052
Mining and 
manufacturing tariﬀ 364 0.341 0.022 362 0.336 0.030
Notes: SC   scheduled caste; ST   scheduled tribe; n.a.   not available.Table 7A.2 Sectoral tariﬀs and poverty and inequality in rural and urban India
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Dependent variable: Poverty rate
Agricultural tariﬀ –0.219∗∗∗ –0.213∗∗∗ –0.242∗∗ –0.240∗∗
(0.071) (0.070) (0.097) (0.102)
Mining and manufacturing tariﬀ 0.277 0.221 –0.154 –0.148
(0.318) (0.297) (0.163) (0.154)
No. of observations 725 725 725 703 703 703
B. Dependent variable: Poverty gap
Agricultural tariﬀ –0.081∗∗∗ –0.080∗∗∗ –0.066∗∗ –0.065∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029)
Mining and manufacturing tariﬀ 0.062 0.041 –0.072 –0.071
(0.123) (0.113) (0.049) (0.047)
No. of observations 725 725 725 703 703 703
C. Dependent variable: StdLog consumption
Agricultural tariﬀ –0.110∗ –0.110∗ 0.060 0.060
(0.064) (0.062) (0.091) (0.092)
Mining and manufacturing tariﬀ 0.030 0.002 0.000 –0.001
(0.220) (0.208) (0.131) (0.129)
No. of observations 725 725 725 703 703 703
D. Dependent variable: Log deviation of consumption
Agricultural tariﬀ –0.037 –0.035 0.053 0.053
(0.025) (0.025) (0.066) (0.066)
Mining and manufacturing tariﬀ 0.073 0.064 0.024 0.022
(0.109) (0.111) (0.076) (0.074)
No. of observations 725 725 725 703 703 703
Notes:All regressions include year and district dummies. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected
for clustering at the state year level. Regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of people
in a district.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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Comment Robin Burgess
This is a pathbreaking paper. The literature on trade liberalization has
tended to look at productivity and growth eﬀects in the narrow domain of
manufacturing. Where distributional impact has been considered, the focus
again has been on inequality in the wages of manufacturing workers. The
welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization have received scant attention. Yet ar-
guably this is what policymakers are interested in as they weigh their options.
The implications of having limited rigorous evaluation in this area of
policy are serious. Too often the debates on liberalization and globaliza-
tion degenerate into a battle between opposing ideologies based on ﬂimsy
evidence. Examples of positive or negative eﬀects are marshaled alongside
supportive theories to defend a given position. The poor evidence base also
implies that debates occur at a general level. Instead of focusing on the ad-
visability of pursuing particular elements within a liberalization reform
package the debate tends to become polarized into camps for and against
liberalization.
The reason that limited progress has been made in evaluating the welfare
eﬀects of trade liberalization has to do with data. Finding repeated obser-
vations on poverty and inequality and linking them to exposure to trade
liberalization has proven problematic. This paper breaks this deadlock by
exploiting the fact that India has repeated household surveys, which en-
ables the author to construct district-level measures of rural and urban
poverty and inequality. The household surveys span a period of rapid trade
liberalization. Exposure of a district to trade liberalization is determined
by prereform industrial structure. Having a higher share of employment in
a sector that has experienced tariﬀ reductions implies that it is more ex-
posed to falls in trade protection. By regressing district trade exposure cap-
tured by employment-weighted tariﬀrates on district poverty and inequal-
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zation and Public Policy Program at the London School of Economics, and a faculty research
fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.ity, the author is able to get a sense of whether districts with industrial
structures, which made them more exposed to tariﬀ reductions, experi-
enced more or less poverty or inequality reduction than districts that were
less exposed.
What Topalova ﬁnds is fascinating. Districts that were more exposed to
tariﬀ reductions experienced lower falls in rural poverty. Urban poverty
was unaﬀected by tariﬀ reductions. Rural and urban inequality were also
unaﬀected. The paper convincingly demonstrates that these results are ro-
bust independent of the speciﬁcation used. The author is careful to point
out that these are relative, within-India results—she cannot say anything
about the overall eﬀects of trade liberalization on poverty and inequality.
The paper also devotes considerable attention to establishing the exogene-
ity of tariﬀs and to ensuring that poverty and inequality are correctly mea-
sured at the district level.
Where the paper is weaker is in establishing the mechanisms through
which trade liberalization aﬀects rural (and not urban) poverty. When the
author breaks out tariﬀrates she ﬁnds that it is agricultural tariﬀs (and not
manufacturing and mining tariﬀs) that are driving the results. This is an in-
teresting ﬁnding, in particular as India was diﬀerent from other liberaliz-
ing countries as it reduced tariﬀs in agriculture as well as in other sectors.
And this ﬁnding is of central importance, given that agricultural tariﬀ re-
ductions will be a core issue in upcoming trade rounds.
However, it was not at all clear to me how tariﬀ reductions impacted ru-
ral poverty. Are these eﬀects coming through cheaper agricultural imports
driving down prices and wages? And, if so, do we see diﬀerent eﬀects de-
pending on the mix of rural households in a district that are net consumers
or net producers of food and agricultural labor? The author ﬁnds some
evidence of a positive correlation between agricultural imports and rural
poverty, which takes us some way in this direction. I nonetheless would
have liked to have seen more work linking tariﬀ reductions and imports to
speciﬁc characteristics of districts that would mediate their impact on ru-
ral poverty. This type of analysis would greatly strengthen the paper and
help us begin to understand why the eﬀects are rural speciﬁc. I also felt that
a little more attention could have been given to reconciling the fact that we
see no eﬀect on rural inequality, even though rural poverty is aﬀected.
The question of why urban poverty was unaﬀected is also not clear, given
that other work by the author has shown positive eﬀects on manufacturing
productivity of tariﬀ reductions. We would also expect wage and price
eﬀects linked to trade liberalization to aﬀect urban residents. Pointing to
the overall small size of the manufacturing sector aﬀected by tariﬀ reduc-
tions is important, but clearly the paper is only scratching the surface here.
Given that tariﬀ reductions in other countries have tended to focus on
nonagricultural sectors, this is clearly an area where the analysis could be
deepened.
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survey rounds before and after the major trade liberalization in 1991 to
look at eﬀects on poverty and inequality. She interprets the coeﬃcient on
her district trade exposure coeﬃcient as the short- or medium-run eﬀects
of trade liberalization. This then raises the question of what will happen in
the longer term, as terms-of-trade shocks die down. As more recent data
come in it would be interesting to see whether the negative impacts of dis-
trict trade exposure on rural poverty weakens over time.
We know that rural and urban district poverty rates have been falling
over the period of the analysis. The ﬁnal question left open by the paper
concerns understanding what is leading poverty to fall more in some dis-
tricts than in others. The author’s preliminary analysis of the correlation
between poverty and openness to foreign direct investment goes in this di-
rection. Looking at what has been driving the growth in services that may
be less aﬀected by trade liberalization but are likely to be an important part
of the poverty reduction story is another way that this work could be ex-
tended to give us a more complete picture of the links between liberaliza-
tion and poverty in Indian districts.
Related work by the author ﬁnds that the most pronounced eﬀects on
poverty occurred in areas with inﬂexible labor laws (Topalova 2004). This
suggests that rigid labor markets fostered by state-speciﬁc labor regula-
tions prevented the reallocation of labor in the face of trade liberalization,
thus retarding the pull out of poverty of the poorest subsistence farmers.
In contrast, in ﬂexible labor areas, where reallocation was easier and
growth was faster, the impact of trade liberalization on poverty was negli-
gible. This highlights how the impact of trade liberalization may be het-
erogeneous depending on the functioning of labor institutions in diﬀerent
parts of India. Domestic policies pursued by state governments clearly
have a bearing on the impact of trade liberalization on the welfare of citi-
zens under their jurisdiction. In particular, labor mobility is emerging as a
key theme in understanding why the impact of a common trade liberaliza-
tion reform varies across diﬀerent regions of a country like India.
As with all pathbreaking work, this paper raises more questions than it
answers. I can see a host of researchers pursuing the questions posed by
this important paper in coming years. The paper is an important example
of a rising body of work that attempts to use microeconomic variation
within countries to evaluate the impact of macroeconomic policies. A huge
amount of work has gone into building the household, industrial structure,
and trade data sets that underpin this paper. And the author has analyzed
these data in a careful and meticulous manner. The policy payoﬀ from us-
ing careful microeconomic data analysis of this type to examine the welfare
eﬀects of trade liberalization is enormous. The paper has begun to illumi-
nate the mechanisms through which reductions in trade protection aﬀect
the welfare of rural and urban residents in India, and the author is able to
334 Petia Topalovalook at liberalization in a disaggregated manner. For example, she ﬁnds
that tariﬀ reductions and openness to foreign direct investment have op-
posing eﬀects on rural poverty rates. She is also able to control for other
factors, like ﬁnancial liberalization, in her regressions, thus adding to the
robustness of her results. This type of analysis, where diﬀerent elements of
a liberalization package are examined, is a major advance on cruder ap-
proaches that identify liberalization only via year dummies.
Trade liberalization is an important area of policy on which we had very
little concrete evidence on welfare eﬀects before the arrival of this paper. In
my view the type of analysis of which this paper is a sterling example will
transform the way we do international economics and bring a large chunk
of the ﬁeld into applied microeconomics. As this paper clearly demon-
strates, this will be a welcome development both in terms of improving our
ability to understand the impact of trade liberalization and in terms of be-
ing able to design it to enhance citizen welfare.
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